What does it Say and Mean for the United States?
A guest post from our California partner, A Voice for Choice Advocacy works. Together our organizations have been following the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pandemic Treaty.
On April 16, 2025, the World Health Organization held the extended 13th and final meeting of its Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) to finalize the Pandemic Treaty. Originally scheduled to conclude in February, this extra session was added ahead of the late May World Health Assembly, where 194 nations will vote on the treaty.
In this meeting the INB negotiated and formally approved of the latest draft of the Pandemic Treaty, and concluded with closing statements from delegates. You can watch the meeting here. Below is our summary of the key points, but if you would like to read the full draft of the treaty you can here.
What’s in the Treaty?
Although the treaty is described as “legally binding,” most of its language is non-committal. Earlier drafts included the word “shall” to mandate action, but most of those sections are now softened or removed. When “shall” appears now, it is usually qualified by phrases like “in accordance with national law” or “subject to local conditions,” effectively removing enforceability.
Key Additions and Clauses:
- Biological Weapons Convention Acknowledged (Page 1): This is a notable improvement over earlier drafts, which lacked reference to the 1972 treaty. Including it now connects the agreement to existing norms on biosafety and bioweapons control.
- Sovereignty Clause (Page 1): States retain the right to implement health measures under national law, “and obligations under international law,” a phrase that might allow future reinterpretation of national sovereignty.
- Censorship Language (Article 15): The treaty encourages fighting misinformation by “ensuring the timely sharing of information to prevent misinformation, disinformation and stigmatization,” potentially endorsing government-led censorship.
- Climate Change Mentioned (Article 19): New wording links public health threats to issues like climate change and poverty, opening the door to broader emergency declarations.
- Broad Definition of Health Risk (Article 1): A “public health risk” is defined as anything likely to harm health, especially with international impact. This could include non-infectious issues like gun violence or climate events.
- Voluntary Goals, Not Obligations: Most goals (surveillance, risk assessment, immunization, etc.) are aspirational and not enforceable at this stage.
- Future Decisions Deferred to Conference of the Parties (Article 4): This body will decide later how to implement unresolved matters. All major questions—resource sharing, manufacturing obligations, technology transfer—are left to be determined.
This is a huge significant shift because any future protocols or decisions made by the COP will not go through the same treaty adoption process. In effect, countries are pre-approving terms that have yet to be defined, giving the COP broad authority to shape future obligations.
- One Health and Surveillance (Articles 5–6): Countries are expected to promote the One Health approach and create interoperable data systems, raising privacy concerns.
- Contradictions on Health Workforce (Article 7): Encourages retention of healthcare workers, while also supporting their freedom of movement—two potentially conflicting goals. The article also calls for the creation of a “multidisciplinary global health emergency workforce,” which may be deployed by the WHO during health crises.
- Emergency Use Products (Article 9): Nations must allow policies to enable fast-track approval of pandemic-related products. Notably, this section uses the binding term “shall” rather than non-binding guidance, making it one of the few enforceable provisions in the treaty. This clause was reportedly a point of contention during negotiations, as developing countries sought assurances that financial support and resources would accompany such obligations—raising broader concerns about equity and potential shifts in resource distribution.
- PABS System (Article 12): Details of the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing system will be decided later. Some binding language exists (e.g., donation of 10–20% of medical products), but exact terms are still undecided which is extremely troubling as it sets the stage for another pandemic.
- Global Supply Chains (Article 13): WHO will oversee global distribution of pandemic goods, but the specifics are deferred to the COP.
- Regulatory “Strengthening” (Article 14): Actually means faster approval and less oversight of medical products, requiring countries to “take steps” toward expedited regulatory review.
- Permanent Pandemic Readiness (Article 17): Emphasizes continuous community engagement and preparation across all time periods—pre-, post-, and inter-pandemic.
- “Trust the Science” (Article 18): Nations must study what promotes or impedes public adherence to health measures and trust in science.
- Funding TBD (Article 20): Financing details remain vague and are left to the COP.
- National Sovereignty Affirmed (Article 24): WHO cannot mandate vaccines, lockdowns, or treatments. States retain control over their own health policies.
- Treaty Reservations Allowed (Article 27): Countries can now object to specific provisions, which earlier versions did not permit. It is also notable that the treaty establishes a new Conference of the Parties (COP), which will have the authority to develop its own rules and protocols—operating independently of the World Health Assembly, unlike the International Health Regulations.
While overall these changes are a mixed bag, the bottom line is that:
- No country is truly obligated to do anything it doesn’t want to.
- No real benefits are guaranteed—future donations or access to products depend on later agreements.
- All controversial decisions are postponed.
- It’s essentially a framework with room for future expansion by unelected globalists, without the same level of international scrutiny.
After 3.5 years of negotiations, the treaty remains minimal and non-binding. With nations like the U.S. and Argentina pulling back, and key funding sources like USAID drying up, the chances of major changes in the near term appear slim. Most countries will likely approve this draft—largely because it imposes few concrete obligations. For now, it serves as a skeletal framework, with many critical details deferred for future negotiation. However, without clear legislative action from Congress, a future U.S. president could unilaterally re-engage with WHO treaty mechanisms, reinstating commitments through executive authority alone.
SHF and AVFCA will continue to monitor the situation with the World Health Organization and send updates as it progresses.
